Consumer Food Safety Risk Attitudes and Perceptions Over Time: The Case of BSE Crisis by Kalogeras, N. et al.
112th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008
Consumer Food Safety Risk Attitudes and Perceptions
Over Time: The Case of BSE Crisis
Kalogeras N. 1, Pennings J.M.E. 1, 2, 3 , Van Ittersum Koert 4
1 Maastricht University/Depts. of Marketing-Finance, Maastricht, The Netherlands
2 Illinois University at Urbana-Champaign, Dept. of Agricultural & Consumer Economics, Illinois, USA
3 Wageningen University, Dept. of Marketing & Consumer Behaviour, Wageningen, The Netherlands
4 Georgia Institute of Technology, College of Management, Atlanta, GA, USA
Abstract — Recent research has shown that by
decoupling the risk response behaviour of consumers
into the separate components of risk perception and risk
attitude, a more robust conceptualization and prediction
of consumers’ reactions to food safety issues is possible.
Furthermore, it has been  argued that the influence of
risk attitudes and risk perceptions on consumer risk
behaviour for contaminated food products can be used
to formulate effective agricultural  policies and
strategies in case of a food crisis. The question arises
whether or not the influence and magnitude of these risk
variables changes over time and, hence, whether policies
and strategies must be adapted. The BSE (mad cow
disease) crises in the USA, Germany and The
Netherlands in 2001 and 2004 provided us with a
natural experiment to examine the relationship between
risk attitudes and perceptions and behaviour over time.
The results show that in some countries consumers risk
behaviour changed, whereas in others not. These results
are useful to policy makers and decision makers in food
industry in developing more efficient supply chain
management and public policies.
Keywords—  consumer risk behaviour, food safety,
risk attitude, risk perception, time
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent food safety events have led to multiple
market crises and produced varied consumer reactions
worldwide. Consumers’ behaviour has eroded by
several food safety events which had a devastated
impact on the demand of various food products such
as  beef  and  poultry,  among  others  ([1];  [2]).  Hence,
the need to understand the drivers of consumer risk
response to food-related crises that involve life-
threatening design flaws is emerging. Knowing the
drivers of consumer risk behaviour and how they
change during a crisis may allow agricultural policy
makers and the industry to make more informed
decisions on how to develop supply management
strategies to manage the crisis.  Pennings, et al. (2002)
[3] argued that by decoupling the risk response
behaviour of consumers into the separate components
of risk perception and risk attitude, a more robust
conceptualization and prediction of consumers’
reactions is possible. They examined the consumer
reactions to the BSE crisis (mad cow disease) in
United States  (US),  Germany and The Netherlands in
2001. Their results show that the relative influence of
risk perception and risk attitude on consumers’
reactions is different across these countries and that it
depends, amongst others, on the accuracy of knowing
the probability of being exposed to the risk. They
suggest that while effective communication is
effective for some countries, other countries require
more extreme measures with respect to the beef supply
(e.g., product elimination). However, risk attitudes and
risk perceptions may change over time, because, for
example, new information is released about the crisis
and/or consumers become more familiar with the
health risks associated to product-harm in a later phase
than in the incipient phase of a product-related crisis
([4]; [5]). Furthermore, the influence of risk attitude
and risk perceptions on behaviour may change over
time during a crisis, which has consequences on the
development of public policies and industry strategies.
Here, we examine how risk attitudes and risk
perceptions and their relative influence on behaviour
changes over time and how that influences marketing
strategies.
In this paper we use the same decision context as
Pennings et al. (2002): the Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE) crises in the U.S., Germany
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and the Netherlands.  In 2001, the BSE crisis was
spread out in most EU countries including the
Germany and The Netherlands, but it wasn’t fanned
out in US until the end of 2003. The BSE crisis caused
consumer panic and disrupted substantially the meat
markets worldwide (e.g.,[6]; [7]). The strong concern
of consumers with the BSE is  that  contaminated food
beef can cause Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) in
humans. Although the chance of contracting CJD is
very small, consumers’ reactions to the information
related to the BSE crisis have significant consequences
in the beef production industry and international trade
of agricultural and food products (e.g., [8]). Many
governmental agencies (e.g., Economic Research
Service USDA; Canadian Animal Health Coalition)
have been heavily focused on the economic impact
assessment  of  BSE  crises  on  beef’s  and  other  meat
prices and the effectiveness of a series of measures to
safeguard health and restore confidence in beef (e.g.,
[9]), it has not been reported, however, how
consumers reactions to the BSE crisis might have
changed after the incipient phase of these demand
shocks. Estimating consumer reactions at different
phases  of  a  market  crisis  may  be  of  particular
importance to the (food) industry and analysts, and
stakeholders who weight the relative benefits and costs
of being involved in the beef and cattle industry.
Our objective is to examine whether or not the
influence and the magnitude of the separate
components of risk response behaviour of consumers
(i.e., risk attitude; risk perception; and their
interaction) change over time (during different crisis
phases).  We utilize the data from Pennings, et al.,
(2002) and collected new field data in 2004 in the US,
Germany and the Netherlands. The remainder of the
paper is structured as follows. First, we present our
consumer behaviour model. Next, we discuss the
research design and the results, and conclude with
managerial implications and suggestions for further
research.
II. CONSUMER RISK REACTIONS TO BSE CRISIS
The  risk  attitude  and  risk  perception  are  two
different concepts. The risk attitude reflects decision-
makers’ general predisposition to the risk content in a
consistent way and the risk perception reflects
consumers’ interpretations of their chance of being
exposed to the content of the risk (e.g.,[10]; [11];
[12]). Following Pennings et al., (2002) and Lusk and
Coble (2005)[12], we model consumers’ reactions
during  a  crisis  as  a  function  of  risk  attitudes,  risk
perception, and the interaction between them. Suppose
that an individual consumer’s von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility at the phase t1 of a product-related
crisis depends upon wealth U(W). Consumers’
decision on whether to purchase a product is assumed
to be based upon the gain in the utility anticipated
from consuming the infected food product. At the
phase t1 individual consumers are confronted with
specific information regarding the food safety event.
Hence, the gain in utility associated with the
consumption of the product is uncertain because
safety-related issues are not known with certainty.
In Pratt (1964) [13] and Arrow’s (1971) [14]
work, risk management, reflected in the risk
premiump ,  is  a  function  of  the  risk  attitude  (risk
aversion r  ),  the  base  wealth  (W ) of the individual
consumer and the risk perception (with a mean e  and
2s  variance of source of additional wealth). The Pratt
and Arrow’s risk premium (p ) determines the
situation where an individual consumer is indifferent
between holding the perceived risky asset or holding
its mean value minus the risk premium. In formulae:
+WEU t (1 += WU ()e e )p-                        (1)
 where EU is the expected utility of individual at
the crisis phase t1. Using Taylor series expansion
around W, it can be shown that the risk premium p  is
equal to:
)(2/1 2
1
Wrt sp =  (2)
 where )('/)('')( WUWUWr -= is the Pratt-
Arrow measure of absolute risk aversion. The
Equation (2) illustrates that the risk premium of an
individual consumer depends on risk attitude )(Wr ,
risk perception 2s , and the product between them.
This framework implies that not only the risk attitude
and risk perception, but also their interaction drives
the behaviour of consumers.
 Recent conceptualizations in consumer behaviour
support that consumers may select different decision
making strategies in different situations as the
constraints of the situations and/or the knowledge
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about a specific situation may change over time (e.g.,
[15]; [16]). This implies that when consumers’
experience and knowledge may change over time,
consumers become adaptive decision-makers and their
decision making strategy may change. Hence,
consumers’ decision may vary from one choice
environment to another.  These implies that if
consumers  have  a  specific  risk  response  to  a
product/service crisis due to their knowledge and
experience of using such a product at the crisis phase,
say, t1, their  behaviour  may  alter  in  the  light  of  new
information released and/or experiences  at a later
phase t2. That is, the magnitude and influence of
consumers’ risk attitude, risk perception and the
product between them may change during different
crisis phases.
 In this paper, we study consumer risk responses to
BSE crisis in a dynamic behavioural context: from the
crisis phase t1 to t2  by conducting empirical studies
for different segments of the population (in different
counties). From a policy perceptive, the insights that
result from decoupling risk attitudes and risk
perceptions in a dynamic - natural - decision context
can yield important managerial implications for policy
makers and industry decision makers at the different
phases  of  a  market  crisis.  That  is,  we  consider  the
following three possible outcomes that may occur at
the different phases (t1, t2 ) of the BSE crisis:
 Outcome #1: Suppose that the risk perception
drives consumer risk response at the crisis phase t1.
This would suggest that effectively communicating the
‘true’ probabilities of being exposed to risk (when
available) will be a useful way to shape the consumers
risk  response  to  the  BSE crisis  at  that  phase.   If  at  a
later phase of the crisis, t2, the influence of risk
perception on consumer behaviour will decrease
substantially, policy makers and managers should
focus  on  other  ways  (e.g.,  gradual  beef  recalls)  to
decrease the uncertainty of the risk content inherent in
the particular situation.
Outcome # 2: Suppose that risk attitude is the main
driver of consumer reactions to BSE crisis at the crisis
phase t1.  In  such a  case,  the interest  of  policy-makers
and managers  should be centered to the identification
of ways to eliminate the risk (e.g., a total recall of the
product: testing and slaughtering all suspected cows)
because even if the probabilities of being exposed to
risk are small, effectively communicating these
probabilities will have not any substantial influence on
consumer behaviour. However, if at t2 the risk attitude
does not influence consumers’ risk behaviour, the
policies and industry strategies have to be adapted to
the new conditions and these tough measures should
be abandoned.
 Outcome # 3: Suppose that the interaction of risk
attitude and risk perception drives consumer decision
to reduce their beef consumption at the crisis phase t1.
The solution in this case may rely on a combination of
the solutions mentioned above: both tough policy
measures and marketing strategies (e.g., product
elimination) and effective dissemination of health
information are required. If the relative importance of
this  factor  on consumer decision diminishes at  a  later
phase of the crisis, the emphasis of the marketing
strategies has to be placed on influencing the
consumer risk attitudes or risk perception, depending
on which factor’s relative importance is higher.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
To address our research objective, we used a
between-subject research design to examine the risk
reactions of consumers to the BSE crisis in Germany,
The Netherlands and US at two different crisis phases:
2001 and 2004.  The first data was collected during the
first two months of 2001. The BSE was spread out in
the Netherlands and Germany and several cases of
infected cattle have been reported. The consumption
of meat in Germany decreased about 35% just after the
BSE outbreak in the end of November in 2000 (GfK,
2001). At that time the USDA took several measures
to protect US imports from contaminated countries
and animal feeds.  The second data was collected in
the first two months of 2004 just after the BSE was
also fanned out in US: December 23, 2003. Although
the American popular media and press emphasized on
the fact that BSE crisis hasn’t set panic on American
consumers (e.g., WSJ, 21/1/2004 p.12-D), US beef
exports globally reached 461 million pounds in 2004,
or 17% of the 2003 level of 2.523 billion pounds,
creating a serious problem for the US beef industry
and food supply chain that realized losses of about $
4.0 billion [17].
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Table 1: Cross country differences in knowledge about CJD and beef consumption
United States Germany Netherlands
2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004
What do you think contracting CJD from eating beef will do to you? a
· I would die; there is not treatment 24.1% 26.5% 58.7% 48.5% 58.1% 35.1%
· I might die, but there is a glance and chance of surviving 31.5% 25.4% 19.5% 29.7% 17.8% 24.8%
· I would get very ill, and the illness would be chronically 19.4% 20.2% 9.7% 15.2% 15.3% 22.9%
· I would get ill, and will recover after some time 19.4% 22.0% 4.0%  4.3% 4.5% 13.2%
· I would feel ill, but would recover fast 5.6%  5.9% 8.1%  2.3% 4.3%  3.2%
What do you think is your chance of getting CJD of eating beef? (1=small; 9=large) b 2.92  2.39 3.42 3.22 2.77 2.56
Are you concerned with eating beef? (1=not concerned; 9= very concerned) b 3.74 3.55 6.27 4.93 3.80 2.44
Do you trust the information that your government provides? (1=do not trust; 9=fully trust) b 5.93  4.65 3.42 3.83 5.00 5.90
Do you eat less beef because of BSE contamination? a 17.8%  8.9% 58.1% 29.0% 22.9% 17.1%
By what proportion have you reduced beef consumption? a 54.6% 43.5% 77.7% 66.5% 56.4% 38.3%
Have you switched to other meat products and fish products? a 17.8% 16.7% 49.0% 31.9% 19.7% 9.6%
a The differences in knowledge; reduction of beef consumption; proportion of reduction; and switching to other substitutes, among countries were
significant. The chi-square tests on the independence among countries resulted in p-values less than 0.03 in 2001 and 2004.
b The hypotheses that the means of these variables in each year (2001 and 2004) were equal was rejected at the 5% level using ANOVA.
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The research design used in the 2004 field studies
was identical to that one used in 2001 by Pennings et
al., (2002). The scales used in the field studies were
consistent with the definitions of our two key-
variables. Specifically, each scale used in the final
surveys consisted of a 9-point semantic differential
scale and included 3 items.1 All measures, used in the
field studies conducted in 2001 and 2004, had a
reliable construct validity exceeding 7.0=a  [18].
The reduction in beef consumption since the BSE
crisis was measured with a dichotomous variable (no-
yes) and the consumer’s knowledge was measured
through a multiple choice question in which their
knowledge about BSE and its consequences was
tested. Consumers were contacted while they were
shopping. A total of 298 Germans, 233 Dutch and 228
American consumers were interviewed in 2001; and
301 Germans, 326 Dutch, and 595 American
consumers in 2004.2
IV. RESULTS
In this section we present the results regarding
consumers’ risk attitudes and risk perceptions with
respect to beef consumption in each of the three
countries and in both years. The findings show (see
table  1)  that  Germans  have  reacted  most  strongly  to
the BSE crisis in both years than American and Dutch
consumers. The reactions of Germans reactions have
become milder in 2004 than in 2001 (e.g., the 58,7 %
of German consumers in 2001 thought that if they
contracted CJD from eating beef would die, whereas
in 2004 the 48.5% of them thought that contracting
CJD would lead to death). Although the reactions of
1 For the risk attitude scale we measured the following three items: (1)
For me eating beef is worth the risk (“strongly disagree” to “strongly
agree”); (2) I am “not willing to accept” to ‘willing to accept” the risk of
eating beef, and 3) I do not accept the risks of eating beef (“strongly
disagree” to “strongly agree”). The measures of risk perception consisted
of the following three items: (1) When eating beef, I am exposed to “much
risk” to “not much risk”, 2) I think eating beef is risky (“strongly disagree”
to “strongly agree”, and 3) For me, eating beef is … “risky” to “not risky”.
2 The average age of consumers ranged from 42 years in The
Netherlands to 45 years in Germany in 2001; and 38 years in US to 47 in
Germany in 2004. The percentage of women in the three samples ranged
from 51% in Germany to 60% in the US in 2004, and 51% in Germany to
62% in The Netherlands in 2004. Finally, the percentage of consumers
interviewed that have children still living at home ranged from 16% in US
to 60% in The Netherlands in 2001 and 30% in US to 46 in The
Netherlands in 2004.
German consumers have become milder in 2004 (e.g.,
concern with eating beef decreased from 6.27 in 2001
to 4.93 in 2004), they still remain stronger than the
reactions of Americans and the Dutch. The milder
reactions of Germans might due to the slight increase
of their trust to the information that the German
government provides (i.e., 3.42 in 2001 vs. 3.83 in
2004). Dutch consumer reactions follow similar
patterns. Their reaction to BSE crisis has become
milder over the crisis phases and their trust toward the
information provided by the Dutch government has
increased (5.00 in 2001 vs. 5.90 in 2004). In contrast,
American consumers’ trust toward the information
provided by the US government has decreased (5.93 in
2001 vs. 4.65 in 2004). This decrease might be caused
by the fact that the spread of the BSE crisis in US after
December 2003 erode American consumers’
confidence about governmental food safety policies.
  These findings can be better interpreted by
examining the risk attitude and risk perceptions of the
consumers in the three countries in 2001 vs. 2004 by
investigating the average sum score of the risk attitude
and perception scales. The 9-point semantic scales for
each  variable  were  defined  as  follows.   For  the  risk
attitude scale, low values indicate low risk aversion (1
= relatively low risk aversion) and high values indicate
high risk aversion (9= relatively high risk aversion).
For the risk perception semantic scale:  low values
indicate  that  consumers  perceive  more  risk  (1  =
relatively high risk perception) and high values
indicate that consumers perceive less risk (9 =
relatively low risk perception).3 These two definitions
imply that as the average sum-score of the risk attitude
of consumers in each country increases, consumers
become more risk-averse; and as the average sum-
score of risk perception of consumers in each country
increases, consumers perceive less risk. German
consumers appear to be significantly more risk-averse
in both years (risk attitude score of 4.40 in 2001 and
4.51 in 2004) than Dutch (5.04 in 2001 and 4.63 in
2004) and American (5.02 in 2001 and 5.05 in 2004)
consumers. They also seem to perceive significantly
more risk (risk perception score of 4.85 in 2001 and
6.0 in 2004) than US and Dutch consumers (scores of
3 All  the  corresponding  items  to  each  construct  (risk  attitude  and  risk
perception) were recoded to the direction that the given definitions imply.
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Table 2: Explaining consumer beef reduction with risk attitude, risk perception and their interaction in 2001 & in 2004
Did you reduce your beef consumption because of the BSE crisis?  (0= I reduced it ;  1= I did not reduce it)
Risk Attitude (RA) Risk Perception (RP) RA x RP
Nagelkerke’s
R2
Corrected
Classified Choices
               ?1                ?2                    ?3
2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004 2001 2004
United States 51.7
%
45,1
%
84.9% 86,8
%
-0.920*
(0.020)
-0.332
(0.125)
1.291*
(0.000)
0.732*
(0,000)
1.460*
(0.002)
0.445*
(0.005)
Germany 66.3
%
53.8
%
86.6% 83.7
%
-0.549*
(0.021)
-0.659*
(0.010)
0.688*
(0.000)
0.332*
(0.005)
0.294
(0.315)
0.155
(0.565)
The Netherlands 42.6
%
29,5
%
83.6% 92,% -0.010
(0.996)
-0.514
(0,451)
 0.658*
(0.000)
0.876*
(0.000)
-0.152
(0.542)
0.162
(0,565)
Note: An asterisk indicates that each parameter is significant at the 5% level in each examined year. The Nagelkerke’s R2 measures the proportion of
variance of the dependent variable (reduction of beef consumption) about its mean that is explained by the independent variables (?1, ?2, and ?3). The RA
ranges from 1 (relatively low risk aversion) to 9 (relatively high risk aversion); the RP ranges from 1 (relatively high risk perception) to 9 (relatively
low risk perception). Prior to the calculations, the interaction of  RA x RP was calculated using the inverted range of RA responses so that the most
pronounced risk-averse response assumed a value of (-4). The values of the recoded RA and RP were standardized before the calculation of their
interaction (RA x RP) in order to avoid response biases. We performed a Chow test for the equality of parameters for each country in both years. The
null hypothesis was rejected at 5% level for US (F = 25.6), 10% level for Germany (F = 3.9) and 25% for the Netherlands (F = 2.5).
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6.28 and 6.54 in 2001 and 6.1 and 6.7 in 2004,
respectively) but less risk than in 2001 (score of 4.85
in 2001 vs. 6.0 in 2004).  Dutch consumers’ risk
perception became a bit milder during the crisis and
American consumers risk perception slightly
increased.4 These results show some consistency in
risk behaviour of different segments of the population
over time and confirm Hofstede’s (1980[19];
1983;[20]) findings that Americans and Dutch are in
the  same  segment  with  respect  to  their  uncertainty
avoidance whereas Germans are in another segment.
The question emerges how these combined
variations in consumers risk behaviour across different
countries influence consumer decision about whether
or not to reduce beef consumption in the different
phases of the product-related crisis wherein consumers
are confronted with different information flows
regarding the development of the crisis.   Significant
variations across countries were found in 2001 and
2004 by performing logistic regressions in which the
decision of consumers in the three countries to reduce
beef consumption is a function of their risk attitude,
risk perception, and the product between them.  Table
2 shows that the determinants of consumer risk
behaviour (risk attitude; risk perception and their
interaction) influence significantly (although in varied
ways)  the  risk  behaviour  of  consumers  in  the  3
countries in both years. However, the influence of the
determinants as reflected by the absolute values of the
regression coefficients, differ between both years.  The
behaviour of German consumers in 2001 and 2004 is
driven by both risk attitude (?1  = - 0.549; p <  0.02  in
2001 and ?1  = - 0.659; p < 0.01 in 2004) and risk
perceptions (?2 = 0.688; p <0.00 in 2001 and ?2 =
0.332; p < 0.00). Dutch consumers’ decision to
decrease their risk consumption is consistently driven
only by their risk perception in both crisis phases (?2 =
0.658; p <0.00 in 2001 and ?2 = 0.876; p <  0.00  in
2004). The risk attitude (?1  = - 0.920; p < 0.02), risk
perception (?2 = 1.291, p < 0.00) and the interaction of
risk attitude and risk perception drive (?3 = 1.155; p <
0.00) the American decision in 2001. However, in
2004 American consumers behaviour is driven only by
their risk perception (?2  = 0.732, p< 0.00) and the
4 The hypotheses that the means of the average sum scores in 2001 vs.
2004 were equal were rejected at the 5% level. For US and Germany and
10% level for the Netherlands.
interaction of risk attitude and risk perception (?3 =
0.445; p <  0.00).  We  performed  a  Chow  test  (see:
Wooldridge, 2006, pp. 251-252; [21]) for testing the
equality of parameters for each country in both years.
The null hypothesis was rejected at 5% level for US (F
= 25.6), 10% level for Germany (F = 3.9) and 25% for
the Netherlands (F = 2.5). Therefore, these results
demonstrate that, American and German consumers
risk behaviour has changed over years, whereas Dutch
consumers’ behaviour has slightly changed.
To gain further insight into the dynamics of the
influence of risk attitude and risk perception on
consumption, we performed additional analyses that
account directly for the effect of time. That is, we
pooled our data from 2001 and 2004 per country and
accounted for the impact of Time (T)  and  the
interaction of  it with each of our explanatory variables
that hypothesized to influence consumer decision to
reduce beef consumption due to BSE over time (Table
3). By performing such an analysis one can gain
insights on whether consumers’ risk behaviour in each
country has changed between the two phases of the
crisis and whether the magnitude of these changes are
gauged with statistical significance, and, hence,
influence the consumers’ decision to reduce their beef
consumption over time. The results show that time has
indeed a significant effect on American and German
consumer decisions (?4 =4.226, p< 0.001; and ?4  =
2.448, p < 0.014) but not on Dutch consumers’
behaviour. They also demonstrate significant changes
in  the  American  consumers  risk  perceptions  (?6 =  -
0.559, p < 0.029) and the interaction of risk attitude
and risk perception (?7  = -1.015,  p  < 0.039) and
German consumers’ risk behaviour (?6  = -0.374;  p  <
0.046). These changes in the magnitude of
explanatory variable regressors indicate the extent to
which the time effect influences the risk behaviour
over time. For instance, the statistically significant
change in the magnitude of American consumers risk
perception (?4 –  ?6 = 1 .291 - 0.559 = 0.732) shows
that risk perception still influences consumer risk
perception over time; however, its influence has
decreased.
   Further, we performed a joint test to see whether
the subgroup of our explanatory variables interacting
with the time effect explains the variation in the
decision to reduce beef consumption. Thus, the subset
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Table 3: Explaining consumer beef reduction with risk attitude, risk perception and their interaction over time
Did you reduce your beef consumption because of the BSE crisis?  (0= I reduced it ;  1= I did not reduce it)
Risk
Attitude
(RA)
Risk
Perception
(RP)
RA x RP Time (T) RA x T RP x T (RA x
RP)T
Nagelker
ke’s
R2
Corrected
Classified
Choices
?1 ?2 ?3 ?4 ?5 ?6 ?7
United States 69.6% 86.3% -0.920*
(0.020)
1.291*
(0.000)
1.460*
(0.002)
4.226*
(0.001)
0.588
(0.192)
-0.559*
(0.029)
-1.015*
(0.039)
Germany
61.6% 85.6% -0.549*
(0.021)
0.688*
(0.000)
0.294
(0.315)
2.448*
(0.014)
-0.119
(0.731)
-0.374*
(0.046)
-0.139
(0.709)
The Netherlands
71.6% 88.6% -0.010
(0.996)
0.658*
(0.000)
-0.152
(0.542)
0.952
(0.412)
-0.504
(0.510)
0.218
(0.226)
0.314
(0.342)
Note: An asterisk indicates that each parameter is significant at the 5% level over time. The Nagelkerke’s R2 measures the proportion of variance of
the dependent variable (reduction of beef consumption) about its mean that is explained by the independent variables (?1, ?2, and ?3). The RA ranges
from 1 (relatively low risk aversion) to 9 (relatively high risk aversion); the RP ranges from 1 (relatively high risk perception) to 9 (relatively low risk
perception). Prior to the calculations, the interaction of  RA x RP was calculated using the inverted range of RA responses so that the most pronounced
risk-averse response assumed a value of (-4). The values of the recoded RA and RP were standardized before the calculation of their interaction (RA x
RP)  in  order  to  avoid  response  biases.  The  dummy variable  (time= T)  is  defined as  0  =  2001 and 1= 2004.  The  null  hypothesis  that  the  subset  of
regression coefficients of the group of variables interacting with the dummy variables is jointly equal to zero was rejected at 5% significance level for
US and 10% significance level for Germany.
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of these variables’ regression coefficients is jointly
assumed to be zero (see; Pindyck and Lubinfeld, 1996,
pp.128-129; [22]). The null hypothesis  that the time
effect haven’t had influenced the risk attitudes and risk
perceptions of consumers was rejected at 5% level of
significance for US and 10% level for Germany. This
result implies that the effect of time influences the
impact that risk attitudes and risk perceptions have on
the components of consumer risk behaviour which is
subsequently played out in changing consumer risk
behaviour with respect to the BSE safety events over
time.
V. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
This analysis suggests different policy implications
for different countries. In addition our results show
that in some countries the relative importance of risk
attitude and risk perceptions does not change over
time and hence that in these countries agricultural
policy makers and industry managers do not need to
adapt their strategies.  However, for other countries
the relative importance of the risk variables does
change, calling for different policies and strategies
during  the  period  of  a  crisis.  For  example  in  the  US,
the adoption of tough measures (e.g., testing and
slaughtering  all  cows)  is  required  in  the  first  phase
because risk attitudes drive consumption in that phase
of the crisis. However, the implication of this policy
only may not be effective in a later stage of the crisis
because in the second phase of the BSE crisis both risk
attitudes, risk perceptions as well as their interaction
drive American consumers’ behaviour. Hence in that
phase  of  the  crisis  the  solution  has  to  rely  on  a
combination of both tough policy measures and
effective dissemination of health information (thereby
influencing all the components of consumer risk
behaviour). The importance of the change in the
magnitude of American consumers perceptions over
time (decreasing importance of risk perception on
consumer behaviour) should be considered and adapt
the use and development of communication strategies
to the extent that is required.  The same holds for
countries  such  as  Germany,  where  both  risk  attitude
and risk perceptions drive behaviour over time. That
is, not only the need of product elimination from the
supply chain is suggested but also the establishment of
effective information systems that will disseminate
accurate information by the government, the industry
and  media  is  required  but  to  a  less  extent  than  in  the
past. In contrast to US and Germany, the behaviour of
consumer in The Netherlands is mainly driven by their
risk  perception  in  both  phases  of  the  BSE  crisis,
suggesting that communicating the true probabilities
of contracting CJD is a sufficient policy tool during
the various crisis phases.
 The findings of the current study may provide
guidelines and fruitful thought for further research on
modeling consumer risk behaviour regarding food
safety events over time. Our results indicate that
consumer decision during the phases of a product-
related crisis is a function of consumer risk attitude,
risk perception and the interaction among them for
different consumer segments. Future research on
consumer over time may extend this framework, by
modeling explicitly the extent and determinants of
consumers’ response behaviour from a specific
decision environment to another subject to moderate
or more severe information loads received by
consumers  at  different  phases  of  a  crisis.   Hence,
policy makers and mangers may gain valuable insights
on how consumer knowledge and decision making
interacts and whether specific factors (i.e., lack and/or
format of accurate information) may lead to
consumer’s adaptivity success or failure.
 Two limitations of our research should be
mentioned here. First, we tested the proposed
conceptual model and we made relevant inferences by
using a between-subjects research design. Although,
the empirical investigation of consumer reactions to
food -related crises that involves life-threatening
design flaws over time by using a within-the-subjects
design, seems difficult to be implemented – the events
are unexpected and, hence, makes it difficult to gauge
the same consumers in super market aisles during the
phases of product-related crisis – is challenging. Such
a research design may provide more precise
information on how consumers’ behaviour evolves
and unfolds during the crisis phases. Second, we
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conceptualized that consumers belong to specific
market segments at country level. We indicated briefly
the cross-cultural differences in trust and knowledge
of consumers, but our theoretical and empirical
analysis did not account for the influence of these
factors on consumer risk behaviour. The heterogeneity
in consumers’ shopping and consumption habits (e.g.,
switch to substitute other meat products, the extent of
involvement, etc) and/or psychological traits (e.g.,
trust and confidence to governmental agencies, etc)
may also influence consumer reactions over time.
Taking the heterogeneity of consumer into account is a
challenging research task since one has to allow the
magnitude and influence of the determinants of risk
behaviour (i.e., risk attitude; risk perception and their
product) to vary across different segments of
consumers. Work is in progress to examine the impact
of consumers’ characteristics on the components of
their risk behaviour food-related crisis over time.
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